## United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



## APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DOCKET NO. 74-1912

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-against-

GEORGE FLORES,

Appellant.

SUPPLEMENTAL
APPENDIX FOR APPELLANT GEORGE FLORES

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK



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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
2	x
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :
4	vs. : 73 Cr. 1140
	GEORGE FLORES, :
5	Defendant. :
6	x
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8	BEFORE: HON. Charles E. Stewart, Jr., D.J.
9	May 9, 1974 2:20 P.M Room 705
10	2:20 P.M ROOM 703
11	
12	APPEARANCES:
13	PAUL J. CURRAN, ESQ.,
14	United States Attorney For the Government,
15	BY: ALAN KAUFMAN, ESQ., Assistant United States Attorney.
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16	DANIEL MEYERS, ESQ., For the Defendant.
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(In the robing room.)

MR. MEYERS: I called to your Honor's chambers today for the purpose of disposing of pretrial problems, to resolve certain pretrial problems.

Your Honor, we have a threshhold problem that needs resolution. That threshhold problem is, I believe, a failure of the government in this case to comply with the Second Circuit rules regarding prompt disposition of criminal cases.

This is an unhappy situation because my client has been detained on bail that he has not made for a period which even that is in dispute. But taking the government's date, since October 15, 1973 when he was arrested in the District Court of Puerto Rico. The first court appearance that my client made subsequent to the removal proceedings was on November 27, 1973 when he was brought before a magistrate, Magistrate Gotell in this courthouse.

For ten days prior to his November 27 appearance Mr. Flores was detained at West Street and was not called by any official of this courthouse or by the prosecutorial agencies to appear before Judge Gotell and on November 27 Judge Gotell set bail at \$10,000, a personal recognizance bond secured by \$1,000.

That bail, your Honor, was reviewed by Judge Gotell two days later and there was no reduction.

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On December 27, 1973, Mr. Flores was arraigned for Judge Carter and the same bail conditions were continued and the matter was assigned to Judge Stewart for all purposes.

On February 11, 1974, I brought on a motion that was made returnable before Judge Stewart but was referred to Judge Lasker because your Honor was on vacation. At that bail application Judge Lasker continued the \$10,000 personal recognizance bond and required only a five percent security or \$500 cash. That is Mr. Flores' present bail.

Today is May 9, 1974. There have been no pretrial proceedings in this case, none of which has been caused by the defendant.

THE COURT: Is Mr. Flores out on bail?

MR. MEYERS: No, he is here in the custody of the United States Marshall's office.

THE COURT: Still in West Street?

MR. MEYERS: Still in West Street, yes, your Honor.

Your Honor has been engaged in a trial which commenced sometime in February of 1974, the case I understand is the United States against Riland. Because your Honor was engaged and the jury is just out now, and we are having this conference at a time when the jury is deliberating on this matter.

Sometime in April I received a telephone call from

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a person who purported to be Judge Levitt's law clerk. He informed me that the matter was referred to Judge Levitt for all purposes. I in turn got in touch with Mr. Weinberg, your Honor's law clerk to determine how the assignment was made and I was satisfied that it was made by the assigning committee under the rules of this court.

On three occasions, none of which were due to the delay of the defendant, the pretrial conference before Judge Levitt was cancelled by the Judge. Specifically on April 11, we went to Judge Levitt's chambers at 4 p. m. A telephone call to me cancelled that appearance at the Judge's request and it was adjourned to April 18. On April 18 at 9:30 we were to have a conference on this case before Judge Levitt again. Again, it was cancelled by the Judge and no further date was given.

I might add parenthetically that during the entire period of time I was in constant telephone communication with Mr. Kaufman and with Judge Levitt's clerk. I was in the process of trying to move this case.

My client has been in jail, it is not a serious case. The case involved an alleged transfer of one shotgun for a price of \$125 and to be in jail for as long as he has been in jail on a case that I think Justice Reinquist characterized as not really needing to reach the proportions

of a federal prosecution -- he said that in a postal case -- makes this a very unhappy circumstance for my client.

Now, we are here today before this court with the concept that this case is going to trial as soon as the Riland matter is over. I say, however, your Honor, that a reading of rule 4 of the Second Circuit Court Rules regarding the prompt disposition of criminal cases, and having in mind the two leading cases in this circuit, to wit, Hilbert against Dowling, 476 Fed Second 355, a 1973 decision and United States against Lasker, the citation for which is 481 Fed Second 229, this indictment should be dismissed.

And now, the prosecutor will speak obviously for himself. He is going to cite a case to this court of the United States against Terinkian, 488 Fed Second 873, a Second Circuit case.

The last paragraph of that decision stated without any citations that under the facts and circumstances of that case, that because Judge Rosling's calendar was congested and because of the death of Judge Rosling, Rule 4 would not apply.

THE COURT: Have you got a copy of Rule 4 there?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, I have a copy of Rule 4.

As I read the rule with the exceptions to this absolute six month rule, I find that none apply except for possibly the rule which talks in generic terms about extraordinary circum-

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stances. I say, your Honor, that if the court congestion is being urged upon --

THE COURT: The problem is, Mr. Meyers, that Rule 4 says, it gives a time within which the government must be ready for trial. Are you contending that the government was not ready?

MR. MEYERS: I am contending that the government was actually ready for trial and in the language of Hilbert against Dowling, the government had to make every effort to see there was a trial. I admit that a notice of readiness for trial was served upon me and a copy of which I gather was served on the court around January 11, 1974.

Your Honor, on January 11, 1974, I was ready to proceed to trial. I don't think there is any question in this case that I never got or ever applied to the court for an adjournment nor asked for an adjournment, that is not here.

What is here is a piece of paper which says they are ready for trial. This Riland case I know was not on trial, not a trial case, there was no jury on January 22, 1974, the day that the government said it would actually commence trial.

I think that the government under Rule 4 and under the language of Hilbert against Dowling has an affirmative burden to find an available court. Even assuming, Judge Stewart, that you were going to try the Riland case, at the

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time the notice of readiness was served and for some two or three or five or six months thereafter, I would say it is insufficient for the government not to try to find an available court to try that case. Especially, your Honor, since the government's own representation is that this case will take one day to try, maybe a day and a half.

There will be two government witnesses and there probably will be no defense witness so it is not a case which will take very long to try.

My client is indigent and I am a CJA attorney and there is no delay caused by my client. He has been in jail continuously since being arrested in the District Court in Puerto Rico, he being unable to make the bail.

The six months have expired, he has been arrested more than six months ago and for all the reasons I have stated, I believe that this indictment, 73 Cr. 1140, must be dismissed and I so urge at this time.

THE COURT: When was he arrested?

MR. MEYERS: He was arrested according to the government October 15, 1973 on a warrant that was issued August 27, 1973 out of the Magistrate's office in this court.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kaufman?

MR. KAUFMAN: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.

So the record may be clear, the warrant for Mr.

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Flores' arrest was issued as Mr. Meyers said on August 27, 1973. Mr. Flores was thereafter located in Puerto Rico and on October 15, 1973, was arrested in the District Court of Puerto Rico.

Removal proceedings commenced there and in the month of November he was removed back to the Southern District of New York. My information is that he was returned to the Southern District of New York on November 17, 1973.

Due to possible negligence in the Marshall's office, the United States Attorney's office was never informed that Mr. Flores had been returned and it was only due to the follow up phone call on my part to the jail at West Street to find out whether or not Mr. Flores had returned at, when I was told he had been there ten days.

Immediately upon learning he had been returned we had him brought over and arraigned before the magistrate.

About within a month an indictment was filed and on January 11, the government filed a statement of readiness for trial as of January 22, well within the six months from the date that Mr. Flores was arrested in Puerto Rico on October 15, 1973.

Mr. Meyers said since the prospective date for this trial, which is May 13, 1974, falls at a time which is longer than six months from the date Mr. Flores was arrested in

Puerto Rico, that under the Second Circuit Rules for prompt disposition of trials, the indictment should be dismissed.

Those rules, though, specifically would relate to the government filing a statement of readiness for trial and prosecuting the trial which the government, of course, did, well within the six month period.

Mr. Meyers is now making the argument that it is the prosecutor's burden once it became aware that your Honor was not able to try the case due to the continuing Riland trial, we had an obligation to go Judge shopping and find a judge who would try the case.

Quite frankly, I don't know why the prosecutor's office, if it does have such a burden, should have a burden any more than defense counsel. Defense counsel could just as easily have made a motion to try the case, to have the case reassigned to a judge because of the fact that the defendant was incarcerated.

No application either formally or informally was made by Mr. Meyers to my office that we should look around and try to get the case reassigned.

THE COURT: It seems to me that certainly I don't believe that the defendant has any burden to try to find an available judge. Equally I am not clear what burden, if any, the prosecution has.

MR. KAUFMAN: As far as the law is concerned, number one, it is the first I have heard of the case that he is citing. I am not familiar with them and if there is a legal argument to be made on it, I request that it be done on papers.

mentioned by Mr. Meyers holds in the last paragraph that evidently the defendant was tried more than a year after the date of his arrest and evidently the reasons for the delay were, number one, the condition of Judge Rosling's calendar and, number two, the fact that the Judge died on April 16, 1973, his death occurring more than six months after the date of the defendant's arrest and the court held that there was absolutely no merit to the claim that the indictment should be dismissed.

As far as the calendar congestion and the Riland case, when your Honor evidently realized that that case was going to be a lengthy trial, the Flores case was reassigned to Judge Levitt who was ready to try the case immediately as evidenced by the fact that he scheduled a pretrial conference.

The pretrial conference was scheduled April 12 which was a Monday or a Tuesday, I believe a Tuesday and when I came in my office that Monday, I heard that Judge Levitt had taken ill over the weekend and I am not at all sure of the extent of

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Judge Levitt's illness but shortly thereafter we received a call from his clerk adjourning that pretrial conference for a week, and again, at the second adjournment it was again adjourned without date and thereafter we were informed that the case was reassigned back to your Honor. So the facts seem fairly similar to those in the Terinkian case as far as the calendar congestion and illness.

THE COURT: There is no question but that it is unfortunate.

MR. KAUFMAN: That case clearly holds that in such a situation there is no merit to the claim that a dismissal is warranted under the Second Circuit.

MR. MEYERS: Your Honor, first of all, the
Terinkian case was the only one Mr. Kaufman read from and
there is no citations for the proposition, we do not know
what the calendar congestion means in the words in that
decision, there are no footnotes to indicate what type of
congestion they were talking about.

It seems to me, though, that the language of Judge

Mansfield in Hilbert, and by the way, I believe Judge

Mulligan was the author of the decision we are discussing,

in no way refers in that last paragraph of the predecessor

case of Hilbert against Dowling and the U. S. against Lasker,

anywhere that this circuit attempted as I read in both of those

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cases, to say what they meant as the office of the prompt disposition rule.

And Judge Mansfield, it seems to me in very strong language talks about the constitutional rights of individuals that cannot be violated, which is encompassed in the six month rule. He talks about the government being put on notice it has to comply with the rules, which he felt has enough leeway for the legitimate needs of preparing a prosecution, it will be foreclosed from proceeding with the prosecution and use of the word notice. That the government is on notice.

He then talks about the purpose of Rule 4 and in a decision in which he says it is to insure that regardless of what the defendant has been promised or his constitutional rights infringed, that the trial of the charge against him will go forward promptly. We are not dealing with a statute that encompasses the public policy of Congress and Judge .

Mansfield talks about the congressional history of a speedy trial rule. That it is the public policy of this circuit and many other circuits and Congress to see that cases are tried within six months. This case has not been tried within six months. The government has the burden to see that it is to be tried within six months. I say that the government has failed.

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THE COURT: It hasn't been tried within six months after arrest but still you haven't used the six months since indictment.

MR. MEYERS: Rule 4 says whichever is the earliest. The government should be ready for trial within six months from the date of the arrest, service of summons, detention or the filing of a complaint or formal charge upon which the defendant is to be arraigned, other than a sealed indictment, whichever is earliest. The earliest day in this case, your Honor, it could be argued is August 27. But I wasn't arguing August 27. I will accept the date of October 15 as the date of arrest. The rules are clear.

THE COURT: I think the rules are clear, Mr. Meyers but I think they impose a burden on the government and the government has met their burden. I will deny your application.

MR. MEYERS: I just ask you to consider one other thing they had in Hilbert against Dowling. It went up on mandamus because Judge Dowling dismissed the first indictment because of the failure of the government to prosecute within six months. He dismissed without prejudice to the government to reindict and the government in fact did reindict and that was a test of the propriety of the government reindicting and to run the man a six month period.



Judge Mansfield said that the original dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice and that this reindictment is a circumvention that would not be countenanced and the second indictment was dismissed.

So, your Honor, I think that regardless of any other factors involved in this case, this prosecution is not timely.

THE COURT: I disagree.

MR. MEYERS: Respectfully except, your Honor.

Point two, your Honor, is discovery and inspection and we have gone through informal discovery and there are just certain items I might report that we have agreed the government will give to the defendant what is in dispute under Rule 16.

THE COURT: Why don't you skip that and tell me what is open?

MR. MEYERS: I asked the government to inform me whether there was an informer who introduced my client to the undercover agent, whether such informant was present at the time of the alleged transactions that the indictment is concerned with; and whether at such time other people were present during that transaction.

My request was, one, to reveal whether there was an informant, and if there was for me to be able to interview such informant before the trial of this matter.